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1.0 INTRODUCTION. The NASA Headquarters SPRR document NHB 1700.7 (Safety Policy and
Requirements for Payloads Using the Space Transportation Sys*4em), e stablishes both
technical and system safety requirements ap p licable to a l l STS (space transportation
system) payloads. It is equally applicable to all payload hardware including new
design, existing design (reflown hardware), and hardware designed primarily for
commercial use. The Implementation Procedure for STS Payloads System Safety
Requirements has been developed to assist the payload organization in implementing
the system safety requirements identified in the SPRR doctonent.
The implementation task is a joint responsibility of the payload organization, the
flight operator (JSC), and the launch/landing site operator (Y,SC). The implementa-
tion procedures for single element type payloads and experiment payloads (such as
Spacelab experiments and pallets or other types of carriers involving a group of
individual experiments) are different and will be addressed separately in sections
5.0 and 1.0, respectively. If, however, individual experiments are integrated into
the STS as a singular entity, they are classified as payloads and will be treated in
the same manner as a single element type payload.
Payload organizations are responsible for assuring that payload systems, including
GSE (ground su pport equipment), comply with NASA safety requirements, and in doing
so, are required to perform a safety analysis and submit a safety assessment report
on each STS payload for ground and fliqht operations. The safety analysis begins
during the payload concept phase and is refined arid expanded as the payload design
matures. The safety analysis results are recorded on the safety matrix, hazard list,
and hazard report forms and presented to the safety review panel as described in this
document.	 This process fulfills the NASA requirement for a hazard analysis end
safety assessment report.
2.0 PURPOSE. The purpose of this document is to provide guidelines and instructions
for the implementation of the SPRR system safety requirements applicable to STS
payloads.
3.0 SCOPE.
	 This document describes the initial contact meeting with the payload
organization and defines the subsequent safety reviews necessary to comply with the
system safety requirements of the SPRR document. 	 Waiver instructions are included
for the cases in which a safety requirement cannot be met.
The launch/landing site content of this document is limited to ground operations at
KSC, Implementation of the Vandenberg Air Force Base launch/landing site- STS payload
safety requirements will he addressed in a future update of this document when that
launch/landing site becomes operational.
4.0 INITIAL CONTACT MEETING. An informal initial contact meeting will be held at
the earliest appropriate time prior to the phased safety reviews. The payload orga-
nization will notify the Manager, STS Operations Office, code PF, JSC, to establish
the initial contact meeting. 	 During this meetinq, the payload organization will be
briefed by the flight operator and the launch/landing site operator. Included in the
briefing will be an overview of the technical and system safety requirements to be
.net by the payload organization, plus instructions for the conduct of the safety
reviews. The payload organization will be provided with the documents and fo rns
necessary for developing the safety assessment report. The payload organization will
be asked to provide a schedule of payload milestones and to request a phase 0 safety
review when the payload design concept has been developed.
5.0 SAFETY REVIEWS. Payload safety review panels have been established by JSC and
KSC to assist t e flight operator, who has prime responsibility for payload design
and flight operations safety, and the launch/ landing site operator who has prime
responsibility for GSE design and ground operations safety. The panels are staffed
by the	 appropriate technical disciplines and are responsible for conducting the
►p hased safety reviews. It is intended that the reviews cover all aspects of safety
in payload design, flight operations, GSE design, and ground operations to assure
compliance with the STS safety requirements.
For convenience of the payload organization, it is NASA policy to be flexible with
the timing and location of the safety reviews. For example, at the option of the
payload organization, the GSE design and ground operations safety reviews may be held
back-to-back with the -)ayload design and flight operations safety reviews at JSC or
they may be conducted ., parately at KSC. However, separate reviews at KSC [Tidy be
necessary because of STS :ravel and manpower constraints. The timing and location of
the GSE design and ground operations safety reviews must be coordinated by the pay-
load organization with the KSC Cargo Projects Office, Code CP, Kennedy Space Center,
Florida 32899.
The safety reviews miy be conducted at four levels of design maturity: 	 Phase 0
through phase IiI. The phase 0 safety review will normally be an informal review
chaired by d JSC Safety representative for payload design and flight operation and a
KSC Safety representive for GSE design and ground operations. The phase I through
phase III safety reviews are formal reviews conducted by the safety review panels.
During the formal reviews, the payload organization should be prepared to give a
presentation which includes a brief description of the payload and its operation,
followed by data unique to the phase being reviewed.
The depth and number of the fonrlal reviews dre determined by the safety review panel
chainnan in conjunction with the payload organization and are dependent on the com-
plexity, technical maturity, and hazard pitential of the payload.
The timing and objectives of the safety reviews are listed below:
PHASE
	 TIME
	
OBJECTIVES
0 Concept Identify safety-critical subsystems, groups,
hazards, and applicable safety requirements
for subsystems ano associated ground opera-
tions.
I	 Preliminary Design	 Assess the implementation approach, review
Review
	
	
hazards and resolution, and develop an under-
standing of verification approach.
11	 Critical Design	 Verify design compliance with requirements,
Review
	
review verification methods.
iiI	 Delivery to	 Validate the incorporation of previous safety
Customer review agreements, assure the satisfactory
completion of safety verification activities,
provide agreement that safety activities have
been satisfactorily completed.
.y
Data that will be presented at the phase 0 through phase 111 safety review meetings
shall be submitted by the payload organization to the Manager, STS Operations Office,
code PF, Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas 110513, for flight and to Chief, Safety
Operations Office, code SF-SOO, Kennedy Space Center, Florida 32899, for GSE and
ground operations.
	
The safety review meetings will be scheduled 30 days after
receipt of the data. A copy of each original approved and signed hazard report
should be included with the data submitted; however, the original of each completed
hazard report must he available to the safety review panel chairman for his signature
at the time of each review. The payload organization is responsible for retaining and
maintaining the original hazard reports.
5.1 PHASE 0 SAFETY REVIEW. During the concept phase of the payload and GSE
development, a Preliminary system-level safety analysis is performed by the payload
organization to determine hazard groups associated with payload subsystem elements
and to identify hazards. The results of this analysis are documented by the payload
organization on a safety matrix (JSC Form 542) and a hazard list (JSC Form 542A).
Instructions for completion of the safety matrix and hazard list are shown in figures
I and 2, respectively.
For a single element type payload, one matrix and one or more pages listing the
titles of hazards will suffice.
The following data are required for a phase 0 safety review:
a. Payload description and operation.
b. Hardware description of safety critical subsystems (existing level, new and
ref I own) .
c. Payload safety matrix.
d. Hazard list.
The payload description dnd operation should be of sufficient detail to permit
identification of all Subsystems, with emphasi-- on stored energy, which have
potential for creating hazards.
During the phase 0 safety review the payload organization should address tentative
plans for any operation that would require personnel training and certification for
hazardous ,irocedures including both flight and ground operations.
5.2
	 PHASE I	 SAFETY REVIEW.	 During	 the	 early	 design phase,	 the	 safety	 analysis	 is
refined and expanded by evaluating each hazard	 for means of eliminating,	 reducing,	 or
controlling the hazard and by	 identifying the
	 approach for	 verifying	 compliance with
the safety requirements. The results of this effort	 are documented on a hazard report
form	 (JSC	 Form 54213). Instructions	 for completion of the hazard report are shown in
figure 3.
To aid the payload organization in performing the hazard analysis, a sample schematic
of a safety-critical subsystem along with examples of a completed safety matrix,
hazard list, a-id hazard report are shown in figures 4 through 1, respectively.
For the single element type payload and its associated GSE, one hazard report for
each hazard is required. For reflown hardware, existing analyses should be reviewed
to determine if the SPAR requirements have been met. If no deficiencies exist, the
analyses may be summarized on one hazard report form.
Each hazard report should stand alone; therefore, it must be supported by data such
as block diagrams, schematics, a description of safety-critical subsystems arid their
operations, and nonmetallic material and radioactive source info rnation. The block
diagram or prelim i nary schematic should indicate the design approach which is
intended to control thc, identified hazard.	 Partial diagrams and schematics are
satisfactory provided the element for hazard control is identified.
The radioactive source questionnaire (JSC Fo rn 44) shall be completed at the time of
the phase I safety review.	 The data provided on this form will suffice for initial
info rnation transfer of radioactive source data required by both JSC and KSC.
	
An
example of a completed radioactive source questionnaire is shown in finure 8.	 The
need for additional information will be based on the source, the quantity, and the
proposed method of usage. 	 The details associated with handling of radioactive
material at the launch/landing site will be negotiated at the ground operations and
GSE phase 0 safety review. Consideration shail also be given to constraints on the
receipt, use, and transfer of materials as authorized by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
Preliminary materials safety assessments (addressing flalTUnabil i 'y, offgassing, and
materials computability with hazardous fluids as applicable) should be conducted for
the phase I safety review and documented on payload hazard reports. If detail
materials information is required to support these reports, the data should be
submitted on a Payload Materials Usage List, JSC Fo nn 5420 (Figure 9).
The following data, which must be submitted 30 days in advance, are required for the
formal presentation at the phase I safety review:
a. Block diagrams, schematics, and/or a description of safety-critical
subsystems and their operations.
b. Hazard reports.
c. Payload assembly and checkout operations to be conducted at KSC, wish
prel im i na y-) t imel i nes .
o. Radioactive source questionnaire.
5.3 PHASE II SAFETY REVIEW. As the payload and GSE design is completed and refined,
the safety ana ysi — isfurther updated and expanded. The original signed hazard
reports completed at phase I are updated to include additional data on control of the
hazard causes and safety verification methods.
The following data are required for a phase II safety review:
a. Safety-critical subsystem descriptions (update).
b. Engineering drawings of safety-critical -.ubsystems when specifically
requested.
a
4
c. Payload .issembIy and checkout operations to be conducted at KSC (update).
d. A list of safety-related failures or accidents.
e. A list of technical operating procedures related to identified hazard
controls and date of availability for review.
f. Updated hazard reports and support data including the following:
(1) A list of equipment generating hazardous radiation.
(2) Radioactive source questionnaire (update).
5.4
	 PHASE III SAFETY REVIEW.	 The safety analysis is completed at the time of the
phase III safety review.
	 The hazard reports completed at phase It are updated and
submitted for final approval. 	 All the safety canpliance data required by the SPAR
document are submitted for review at this time. The official submittal of the safety
compliance data will precede the hardware delivery by 30 days. The safety assessment
report, which is part of the safety compliance data, includes the completed hazard
reports and the identification of any open safety items.
The following data are required for a phase III safety review:
a. Updates of safety-critical subsystems do-scriptions.
h. Updates of safety-critical subsystem engineering drawings when specifically
requested.
c, Results of applicable safety verification tests and analyses.
d. Safety c appliance data as defined in the SP&R document.
All open items are tracked and closeout is formally documented in corres pondence with
the payload organization. The final safety status of the payload will be presented
to the Flight Readiness Review Board.
5.0 WAIVFRS. When a specific safety requirement cannot be met, a completed waiver
request, JSC Form 542C (figure 10) shall be submitted by the payload organization to
the Manager, STS Operations Office, code PF, JSC, for flight. Waiver requests for
GSE and ground operations shall be submitted to the Director, Safety, R&QA, &
Protective Service, code SF, Kennedy Space Center, Florida 32899. All waiver
requests should be coordinated with the appropriate NASA Center prior to submittal
and should be formally submitted as soon as it is determined that a safety
requirement cannot be met.	 Each waiver request will address only one hazard or
hazard cause..	 After initial coordination, the waiver request will be formally
submitted for approval. 	 The payload organization will be formally notified of the
acceptance or rejection of the waiver request. Approval ^f the waiver request will
not relieve the payload organization of the responsibility of meeting the waiver
requirement in all other areas of design and operation of the payload.
7.0 EXPERI MENT PAYLOADS. This section defines the variances to the basic procedures
of section 5.0 for conducting experiment payloads flight operator safety reviews.
5
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Expe -invent payloads are defined as assembl ies rf experiments mounted and/or operated
on or within a dedicated carrier structure and/or the Orbiter. The carrier structure
will be considered as part of the experiment payload, unless excluded by prior
agreement with the STS Operator.
This section does not alter the procedures for conducting the launch/landing site	 t
operator safety reviews as defined in section 5.0. If similar procedures to those
defined herein are requested for GSE design and ground operations safety reviews,
they should be coordinated with the KSC Cargo Projects Office.
7.1 PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION.	 The payload mission manager shall be designated as the
payload organization for experiment payloads. however, when individual experiments
are developed without a specific experiment payload assignment, the single point of
contact for STS payloads system safety at the applicable NASA Center shall assume the
safety tasks of the payload orgainzation until the experiment is assigned.
7.2 INDIVIDUAL EXPERIMENT DATA SUBMITTALS.	 Safety data on individual experiments
may he suNnittea in advance orig t. operator acceptance apart from the formal
payload safety reviews.
	
In addition the data may he submitted by the single point of
contact for STS payloads system safety prior to the experiment being assigned to a
specific experiment payload with a designated mission manager. 	 These advanced
submittals should contain all the applicable experiment safety data for the le-el of
acceptance being requested as defined in this section and in 5.G. The flight
operator's disposition of these data (concurrence/approval of hazard reports, action
items, etc.) will be the same as if the data were presented at a formal payload
safety review. The inissiool manager or the single point of contact for STS payloads
system safet y must sc`iedule all advanced data submittals with the Executive
Secretary, STS Payloa,j Safety Review Panel, Mail Code NS2, Johnson Space Center,
Houston, TX 77058.
7.3 PAYLOAD SAFETY REVIEWS. Formal STS Payload Safety Review Panel meetings on
experiment payloads are normally convened only for reviewing the total integrated
payload (i.e., experiments, applicable carrier structure, and all interfaces). These
safety reviews shouid be scheduled when all the experiments listed on the manifest
for a particular mission are at or above the following levels of design maturity:
phase 0, concept; phase 1, preliminary design; phase II, final design; and phase 111,
delivery. The actual review dates will be 30 days after JSC receives the integrated
payload safety data submittal. Individual ESP's (experiment safety packages) that
are signed by the flight operator prior to the payload safety review should be a part
of the integrated payload safety data submittal.
7.3.1 PHASE O. Since the objective of the phase 0 is to conduct a preliminary
system level safety analysis and to baseline a list of hazards, the phase 0 data
should include conceptual descriptions of the experiments, operations, interfaces,
and safety-critical hardware. A safety matrix (JSC Form 542) and a hazard list (JSC
Form 542A) are required for each individual experiment and for the carrier structure
(if it is included as part of the experiment payload).
Since only a conceptual level of design will be available for review, many interface
hazards may not be definable. Interface hazards for experiment payloads include
interactions of experiment to experiinent, experiinent-to-Orbiter/carrier structure,
and carrier structu re to Orbiter (if applicable).	 If any interface hazards are 	 1
identified and these hazards are not already addressed in the ;ndividual experiment
6
hazarn lists, a separate matrix and 'hazard list for interface hazards should be
prepared. As the design matures and the interfaces are better developed, additional
interface hazards should be added as required. A complete baseline of interface
hazards should be submitted at phase 1.
7.3.2	 PHASE 1. Hazard re ports (JSC Form 542B) are prepared to addre, s each hazard
identifi. on tje hazard lists for the individual experiments, the cerrier structure
(if applicable) , and the interfaces. All hazard reports for an individual experiment
shall be contained in an ESP.	 An ESP shall include (1) a signature cover sheet (JSC
Form 542E); (2) all applicable hazard reports, including support data; and (3) a list
of safety review actions, if assigned. Instructions for JSC Form 542E are contained
in figure 11. Each ESP and each interface hazard report shall stand alone (i.e., it
shall contain supporting data Similar to that specified in paragraph 5.2).
Phase I safety revir^w concurrence in the ESP's shall be documented by the flight
operator's signature on tho cover sheets at the completion of the phase I safety
review.
	
The individual hazard reports in the ESP's will not be signers by the flight.
operator.	 Concurrence in the remaining hazard reports shall be the Same as defined
in section 5.0.
7.3.3
	 PHASE 11. For the phase 11 safety review, the original signed phase I ESP's
and interface hazard reports are updated to include additional data on the control of
hazard causes and safety verification methods.
	
Phase 11 safety review concurrence
will he documented in the same manner as phase I.
7.3.4	 PHASE 1I1. The interface hazard reports and the ESP's completed a'. phase II
are updatE_ and submitted for final approval. The safety assessment report shall
include the completed interface hazard reports and the ESP's. STS operator approval
signature wi'l be required on each ESP and on each interface hazard report.
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_	 NOTE
	
Hazard groups and subsystems are defined
and described	 in JSC	 11123,	 STS Payload Safety
Electrical
Guidelines Handbook.	 The subsystems	 list may be
expanded or modified for specific payloads/GSE.[nv,rotowntaI
control The
	
intent of this	 form is	 to assist the Payload
Organization	 in	 identifying hazards associatedMME r.^t °rf
with the payload/GSE.
INSTRUCTIC'lS:
NydrfuIscf
1.	 For i
	
jingle element type payload Prepare two
MeterIaIs
matrixes, one for the payload and another for
GSE/ground operations.	 For experiment payloads
Mechanical
prepare matrixes for the followinq:
a,	 r ie for each experiment 	 -^
°°t`c'I b.	 one for interface hazards
c.	 the carrier structure 	 (if applicable)
P1f11ure systems d.	 GSE/ground operations
2.	 Complete blocks for payload/GSE/experiment
Propul si on
 payload orqanization,	 date, and pane.
3.	 Determine safety subsystem elements. 	 --
r^`°c"h^'c' 4.	 For edc:h	 identified	 safety subsystem element,
check	 the hazard qroup(s)	 that could apply.
Radiation This will	 be based on the particular hardware,
design, and operation of the subsystem. 	 JSC
Structures 11123 may be used as a guide to determine if
a hazard g roup applies.---
ift fore 142 (Feb 18)Mn%A-JSC
• Rrfertnce 'Gaut rt.ri and Merr,rng" to JSC 11123.
gore 1
8
HAZARD LIST
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PA v LOAD - Enter title of navload, or rayload (',SE. (For experirient payloads
enter payload or ex periment title as aonlicahle)
SUBSYSTEM - Enter- subsystem checked on Safety 'tatrix.
DATE - Enter date form is completed or revised.
WARD W1UP - Enter hazard vroup (checked on Safety "tatrix) that
corresponds to the subsystem above.
HAZARD TITLE - Enter hazard title(s) r ,hich identif y the suet y concern
for each hazard croup listed. Hazards are identified fror^ safety ana,ysis.
APPI-NARLE SAFETY REOUIRE I tENTS - Enter the SP&R Daragra ph rurtbers for the
technical requirements that are relited to each identified hazard.
Complete the hazard List for each suhsjstem checked on the Payload Safety
Matrix. Hazard lists for more than one subsystem may he included on one
hazard list form (see figure 6).
A separate hazard list should be prepa. •ed for GSE and ground operations
s
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PAYWAD HALARD REPORT (I'ni iue	 r:imbor)
'	 Enter Payload,	 r„E or exncriment
	
titles	 frurn 1-azarlist)
VTF:
	 S pnarate hazard retorts
	
ire
	
raguirod for f,S[ and ground o! ,. . tfnty	 P . wifaw	 Pha,'r
•
(date eornl^t^i( T itle of %W/stern from Hazard List)
A:	 T	 1.
(Titj of Hazard frmi Hazard List)
(SPAR paragraphs
	 from Hazard List)
Describe the hazard and its effects on the! Orbiter, other payload, the crew,
and/or ground operations.
	
Define the mission phase(s) when hazard could occur
(i.e., ground operations,
	
boost,
	
etc.).
Itcri i ie each dossihlt hazard cause.
For eacn hazard cause, define
	
the controls desi g ned	 into the system to preclude
or minimize the occurrence of the hazard. 	 Preliminary	 information may he pro-	 .
vided for phase	 I	 and pore details	 provided at phase	 II	 and	 III.
For priase.
	 I,	 identify	 the verification	 approach	 (i.e.,	 test,	 analysis,	 inspection,
etc.).	 For phase	 II,	 identify the test plan	 that verifies	 the effectivrness of the
hazard	 control.	 For phase	 III,	 provido the	 results	 of the	 test,	 analysis,	 in-
spection,	 etc.
Hazard	 Peport	 is	 onen until	 all	 verification	 is	 satisfactorily coinnletod.	 At
phase
	 I,	 provide a	 tentative schedule for completion of 	 the verification	 task.
CONCURRENCE PHASE
	
I PHA SE 	 it
Payload OrKan,zation (Sign	 and	 date)
STS Ot —rator (Sign	 an ,]	 ,late)
APPROVAL
	
PHASE.	 III
Pa y 10.1 - t
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1S6 Fo fa 5418 (Feb 78)
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HAZARD UST
••.^o.0	 ABC MuI tip le  1/11/81
HAZARD
	 GROUP HAZARD
	
TITLE
A P P L I C A 0 L F 	 SAFE Tr
REOUIR[414T
Subs stem:	 Propulsion
Fire Leakage of	 propellant
	
(N 2 11 4 ) 209-1
Collision Inadvertent actuation of pro-
pulsion system 202-2b
Explosion RCS propellant
	
lines	 and tanks
rupture during flight or de- 209-1,	 208-4
ployment operations 208-5
Explosion Rupture of pro pellant lines or
tanks during emergency abort 209-1,	 2001-4
operations 208-5
Subsystem:	 Structures
Collision Failure of primary structural 208-1
assembly as	 a	 result of flight 208-2
or emergency landing	 loads 208-3
I
isc Form 542A (Feb 78)	 Figure 6	 NASA - JSC
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PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT ABC-14
..^. AD r.. A,f
ABC I
Propulsion 6/15/31
RCS Propellant Lines and Tanks -	 Ruptare	 During Flight or Deployment Operations
A/PUf CAOL[
	
SAFt Tr	 ..I	 — f w 'M1 S' I 1
209-1	 Hazardous Materials
	 208-4	 Pressure Vessels
208-5
	 Pressurised Lines and
Fittinr ► ^;
` I" t l ► 11 ON
	
^:,F
	
.. A:AYD1
During flight and deployment operations,	 the ABC RCS sytte.i r ljpturrs	 resulting
in release of shrannel	 and hydrazine and causing damage to the Orbiter and/or
injury to
	
the flight crew.
-••: ► aD	 GAUSt'.
1.	 Material	 defects, degradation and/or undetected damage.
2.	 Overheating of fluid due	 to malfunction of temperature control 	 system.
3.	 Heatin g and autodetonation of hydrazine va por due to adiabatic compression
when	 the	 isolation valves	 are	 initially opened.
.. A., GD
	
(:O%' -	 '.1
1.	 The propellant
	
tanks will	 be designed	 to	 an ultimate	 factor of Safety of	 2_.5.
2.	 All	 p ressurizer lines and	 fittings	 shall	 he designed with a factor of Safety
of 4.0-
3.	 Utilize approved and controlled procedures	 for o perations,	 transportation,
handling,	 and contamination	 control	 to	 preclude system damage.
4.	 Redundant thermal	 control	 syystem with automatic overtemperature cutoff
__-	 (see attached ."h-et)
SAFFTV
	 %f 41 r 1 -, A • :	 N	 VF I —	 i
1.	 Perform a	 systems analysis	 and a structural	 analysis	 in accordance with
11IL-STD-1522.	 Proof	 tests	 and burst tests will 	 he conducted.
2.	 Qualification	 testing	 of	 the thermal	 control	 system.
3.	 Inspection	 pr-o riram to	 assurF, material	 defects are	 identified and proper
corrective action	 is	 taken.
(see attached sheet)
STA%+1
Open.
1.	 System design and analysis
	
in pronress.
2.	 Systems	 and structural	 analyses will	 be completed by November 1981.
3.	 Proof and burst testing will 	 be completed by June	 1982.
4.	 Qualification	 testing and	 analyses will	 be completed	 by Octnber 1982.
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HAZARD CONTROLS:
provisions.
5. Pressure vessel and nlumbinq design meets and exceeds the requirf?ments of
1-1IL-STD-1522.
F. The isolation valves are pyrotechnic valves and will not he on(,n,-d
until ACC is 200 feet from Orbiter.
7. Inadvertent oneninn of an isolation valve will require 3 indenendent
failures or operator errors.
SAFETY VERIFICATION METHODS:
4. A caution will be added to operational nrocedures: "Do not onen
isolation valves until A qC is at least 200 feet from tho Orbiter."
5. Ana:ysis will he conducted to verify pressure system will tolerate
failed "ON" heaters without rupture.
% ki
Fiqure 7
(Continued)
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RAD I UAC1 I VI	 S01)4C1. IIIIE c 11 0,11A IRE
Space I IiCl t IIotdtiale loaf Ali-)I ILatluns
Eynlon 0. Johnson Space Center
I.	 IhEriTIIICAII_DN ► NO DISCP.IPIION
1 . SCs,h^^ ^7 N	
—	
1 I. r', .l	 NRC
	
-
Joe Doe Aerospace Corp.	 AB-9816-09	
_	 slate of -_
3. ADt'HE SS	 I L l ih„/,t
111 W. Main, New York, NY 	 AC (123)456-7890
i,utrFF
	
T. wnNtl	 1' S II	
.—	
^,^ .
Cobalt-60.02	 August 30, 1978
b. VA', - IA',; T  NEH	 7	 A,`, ,•, '.
Nick's Nuclear Source Fabrication 	 222 Broadway, Oak Ridge, TENN.
6. U,k .',l AL IOW"	 ---	 VNY -,I. Al ',IAII
Metallic Cobalt
	 Pellet
10.	 „M R; F ',L At F!
	
T1, ILFhT. NOS.	
-
El y 'S	 q N0	 ZR-12-CO-60
5 >......1^, 
k	
'X1678	 2. 41L lGL ,S ((^r leptern er 5,	 <1 x 104
.. Ir({H^U"^^^A:-lqM l^
	
11th Tfl	 _
100	 r+ 11	 1	 y'C.	 +	 100 ( , C 	 EIATt 9/278
III. SOURCE DIAGRAM
OLIA!L , ,',	 tit A. I'.	 ,	 IF1.,,-. . -	 : - S	 c-,
SEE ATTACHMENT 1 FOR DETAILED DRAWINGS AND NARRATIVE OF SHIELDING CHARACTERISTICS
NUCLEONIC GAUGE.
IV. SOURCE USE 0111
l AP L 1 I •ac N I	 .,,	 , ..	 ,1,4,, ; -
Doedata System - Nucleonic gauge for potable water storage tank.
Source contained in part number JDA 45678-9
2. Pt,kl>,' t
q Eite(nal Calob(ellon	 In111Mh1 Calibration	 El other	 Continual Inflight Use
3. L r) r ATI()JS vAlikE	 '	 -	 .. t',() (jk 57040 ANU APPROXI`aATI DATES
A .	 LOCATIONS e.	 DATES	 FROM TD
Joe Doe Aerospace Corp. 9/1/78 10/1/79
Marshall	 Space	 Flight Center 10/2/79 10/2/80
Johnson Space Center 10/3/50 11/3/80
	 (See attach-
50URCIL	 (',+	 kALIA11CN	 ^.AFLT1'	 OIFI(Lr,
Jack Doe
ro-1
AC	 (123)	 456-7890
0RI(,INATOk'5 SI f ,,A% , E	 -	 ----
r /,_ kL 
--
'A	 F
10/1178
OkIC.I'.AIC,p '^	 h1AIl	 1 •. ,	 Ak':,4k S5
11 1 	W.	 Main,	 New York,	 NY AC (123)	 456- 7890
JSC Foote 44 (Rev ),,n 7g)
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EXPERIMENT	 SAFETY	 PACKAGE	 COVER SHEET
tip
 1.1N N I PA.' ti •	 ,
© O
00. WIND	 TITLE DISPOSITION
© ®	 0!
Blocks
	
1,	 2,	 3,	 4,	 5,	 5,	 1,	 and	 11	 (also	 8 and	 10	 if arnlicable)	 should	 bn
completed by the Payload Organization.
Blocks
	 8,	 1,	 17,	 12 will	 he connleted by the STS operator after the 	 review.
cover sheet nao- number
experiment al phanumeric dnsi gnation and title
payload
	 to r-hich experiment
	 is assign-d
level	 p f 	 review	 (i.e.	 I,	 II	 or	 III)
date nreoared
unique numbrr assigned to the hazard report
title of hazard renort
apnlicahlr rema rks related to the dis positior of t in hazard report
(e.g.	 references	 to assigreo action	 items or changes to renort
made by STS Operator or modifications, deletions etc. mode by the
payload organization)
®	 STS Operator disposition of the hazard report (i.e.
	
open, signed,
disapproved, etc.)
General	 comments related tc entire ESP	 (e ^.	 references to related
interface hazard renorts, action
	 items	 to nrenare additional
hazard reports or uonrade ex periment descriptive and/or support
data,
	 etc.)
U 0
	
aonlicable signature and date
GENERAL C:M*'t ♦ TS:
CONCURPENCi kPP9001,
P A U^D ORGANIZAT ION
11
ti5
	 ^'	 a
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